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Abstract—As the Internet slowly transitions towards IPv6, the 
routing protocols that are used to forward traffic across this 
global network must adapt to support this gradual transition. 
Two of the most frequently discussed interior dynamic routing 
protocols today are the IETF’s OSPF and Cisco’s EIGRP routing 
protocol. A wealth of papers have compared OSPF and EIGRP in 
terms of converge times and resource usage, however few papers 
have assessed the performance of each when implementing their 
respective security mechanisms. Therefore a comparison of 
OSPFv3 and EIGRPv6 will be conducted using dedicated Cisco 
hardware. This paper will firstly introduce each protocol and its 
security mechanisms, before conducting a comparison of OSPFv3 
and EIGRPv6 using Cisco equipment. After discussing the 
simulation results, a conclusion will be drawn to reveal the 
findings of this paper and which protocol performs the best upon 
implementing their respective security mechanisms within a small 
IPv6 enterprise network. 
Index Terms—IPv4; IPv6; OSPFv3; IPSec; ESP; EIGRPv4; 
EIGRPv6; MD5 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Two of the most discussed IPv6 routing protocols amongst 
researchers are the IETF’s Open Shortest Path First Version 3 
(OSPFv3) and Cisco’s Enhanced Interior Gateway Routing 
Protocol for IPv6 (EIGRPv6). A number of papers such as 
[1,2,3,4] have reviewed both protocols countless times with 
respect to their resource usage and convergence speed. 
However, no comparisons have been conducted to assess the 
additional effects when implementing the respective 
authentication and encryption mechanisms of OSPFv3 and 
EIGPRv6. 
Therefore, due to the popularity of OSPFv3 and EIGRPv6, 
it is critical that a through comparison is conducted to 
comprehensively assess both protocols when operating within 
a small IPv6 enterprise network. 
In addition, it should also be noted that in recent years, a 
key drawback of EIGRP has been its proprietary nature. 
However, as discussed by [5], EIGRP is been opened up to the 
IETF and will soon no longer be a drawback. 
This paper contributes to the ongoing comparisons of 
OSPFv3 and EIGRPv6 by testing both protocols and assessing 
the additional impact of both protocol’s security mechanisms 
when they are implemented in a Cisco hardware based test 
environment. 
II. OSPFV3 
OSPFv3 is a dynamic routing protocol that uses the 
Shortest Path First (SPF) algorithm and has been specifically 
designed to run within an IPv6 environment. Compared to its 
IPv4 equivalent OSPFv2, OSPFv3 incorporates a number of 
key changes necessary to operate in an IPv6 network [6]. 
As discussed by [7], a key change that has been performed 
for OSPFv3 is that the packet header of which has been 
restructured. OSPFv3’s packet header is now far less complex 
compared to that of OSPFv2 and also includes the “Instance 
ID” field [7]. The Instance ID field also reflects another 
dramatic change, in that routing protocols for IPv6 are more 
concerned about the links they are enabled on, rather than the 
nodes they are enabled on [7]. This “per-interface” concern 
means that multiple addresses can be configured on the same 
interface [8]. This is because rather than establishing 
neighbourship using IP subnets, OSPFv3 uses link local 
addresses to establish its adjacencies. 
Furthermore, the changes to the OSPFv3 packet header 
have also had an additional effect on the OSPFv3 Hello Packet. 
To reflect the changes made for IPv6, the OSPFv3 Hello 
packet structure has been changed [8]. 
These changes are as follows [7]: 
 The addresses of 224.0.0.5 and 224.0.0.6 are used for 
passing traffic between the DR and DROther routers is 
now FF02::5 and FF02::6. 
 IPv6 addresses in OSPFv3 are located within the 
payload rather than the packet header. 
 Network-LSA’s do not contain any IPv6 addresses 
compared to OSPFv2. 
 OSPFv3 requires that a router ID is configured before 
routing can begin. 
 DR and BDR routers are now identifiable by their 
router ID’s instead of their IP addresses as with 
OSPFv2. 
In addition, a key change for OSPFv3 is the security 
mechanisms that the protocol uses to protect its routing 
updates. As discussed by [7,9], whereas OSPFv2 used MD5 
authentication, OSPFv3 uses the services provided by IPsec, of 
which is used within an IPv6 environment [10]. 
III. EIGRPV6 
Designed by Cisco, the Enhanced Interior Gateway 
Routing Protocol for IPv6 (EIGRPv6) uses the Diffusing 
Update Algorithm (DUAL) which is also used by EIGRP in an 
IPv4 environment. However, unlike OSPFv3, the majority of 
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EIGRP’s features for IPv4 have been integrated into IPv6. As 
discussed by [7,11], these similarities include: 
 The use of DUAL to compute EIGRP Successor and 
Feasible Successors. 
 Using bandwidth and delay as the default metrics. 
 The use of Reliable Transport Protocol (RTP). 
 No periodic updates. 
 EIGRPv6 implements the same authentication 
mechanism (MD5) as EIGRP. 
However, despite the almost identical properties between 
EIGRP and EIGRPv6, a few changes have been implemented 
to prepare the protocol for routing within an IPv6 environment. 
As further discussed by [11], these changes include: 
 The use of Link Local Addresses to establish neighbor 
adjacencies instead of using an IP subnet. This is also 
the case with OSPFv3. 
 EIGRP routers will use the IPv6 multicast address 
FF02::10 rather than the previous 224.0.0.10 multicast 
address. 
 Like OSPFv3, EIGRPv6 is also configured on a per-
interface basis rather than been globally enabled. 
 The creation of a router ID is required to successfully 
start routing operations. 
However, unlike OSPFv3, EIGRPv6 does not incorporate 
the use of IPSec to encrypt its routing updates, but instead uses 
the MD5 authentication method that was previously used in 
EIGRP for IPv4 [7]. 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
To ensure that the most relevant information can be 
gathered to accompany the research undertaken for this paper, 
a clear and concise methodology is required. Therefore, a 
number of specific goals will be implemented to deliver the 
most accurate conclusion possible. These goals include: 
1) To investigate which protocol initialises quickest from a 
cold start-up. 
2) To assess OSPFv3 and EIGRPv6’s ability to recover 
from unforeseen failures. 
3) Analyse which protocol re-converges with minimal 
packet drops. 
4) Investigate the response times of each protocol when 
detecting idle link changes. 
5) Examine each protocols security mechanism and 
implement them to compare their operational differences. 
6) Observe any differences upon implementing both 
protocols. 
Furthermore, to meet the goals designated above, a series 
of controlled experiments will be carried out by implementing 
four Cisco 1841 routers and one Cisco 2960 switch, all 
connected through fast Ethernet ports. 
Moreover, data for this paper will be gathered by using 
outputs from the router’s command line and packets captured 
in Wireshark. It should also be made clear that each test 
performed for either protocol will be conducted three times and 
then averaged to promote result reliability. In addition, each 
specific test will be done again to assess the additional impact 
upon implementing OSPFv3 and EIGRPv6’s security 
mechanism. This test strategy ensures that the additional 
effects of OSPFv3 and EIGPRv6’s security mechanisms can be 
measured, while performing each test three times to ensure 
result reliability. 
Lastly, it should be mentioned that both protocols will be 
operating using the default Hello and Dead timers to ensure 
that the results best reflect the default behavior of both 
OSPFv3 and EIGRPv6. 
V. EXPERIMENT SCENARIOS 
So that a comprehensive and thorough comparison can be 
conducted, two test scenarios have been designed to assess the 
performance of OSPFv3 and EIGRPv6. 
As figure 1 illustrates, test Scenario 1 implements a four 
router point to point test scenario. The purpose of this scenario 
is to assess the performance of both protocols when the routers 
are connected directly and not through another device such as a 
switch. 
 
Fig. 1. Test Scenario 1 
 
Fig. 2. Test Scenario 2 
Furthermore, figure 2 demonstrates the second scenario 
that has been implemented to test OSPFv3 and EIGRPv6. 
Compared to the point to point topology of Scenario 1, 
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Scenario 2 implements a LAN environment where all routers 
connect to a switch. In Scenario 2, the switch will be 
configured with two VLANS to ensure the traffic for each 
interface is separated and kept in their own subnets. Therefore, 
compared to Scenario 1 where each router operates with 
different subnets, the routers in Scenario 2 will operate in the 
same subnet (one for the primary and one for the secondary 
link) and therefore enable an assessment of OSPFv3 and 
EIGRPv6’s performance in a LAN environment. 
Also, so that an active interface is always available to send 
and reply to ICMP Ping messages, a Loopback interface [12] 
will be implemented onto routers R1 and R4. By implementing 
Loopback address on R1 and R4, the traffic can be routed via 
another path depending on the link failed in the topology. 
It should be noted for the purposes of this paper that all 
tests will be executed and monitored from R4’s perspective 
and the preferred interface is FA0/1 towards R2. 
VI. SCENARIO RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This section will discuss the results generated by testing 
OSPFv3 and EIGRPv6 and their security mechanisms, in 
Scenarios 1 and 2. The results are as follows: 
TABLE I. TEST SUMMARY FOR SCENARIO’S 1 AND 2 
Test Details With 
Auth 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
OSPFv3 EIGRPv6 OSPFv3 EIGRPv6 
Convergence 
time from a cold 
router start-up. 
 181.3s 143.4s 182.2s 163.5s 
Y 180.3s 142.4s 180.6s 163.6s 
Neighbour down 
detection after an 
unexpected link 
failure. 
 9.7s 7.5s 9.1s 4.7s 
Y 9.7s 9.1s 9.3s 8.3s 
Traffic re-sent 
after an 
unexpected link 
failure. 
 14.4s 8s 14.9.s 13.5s 
Y 13.6s 11.0s 14.3s 14.9s 
Time for Protocol 
to detect 
neighbour down 
after cable 
removal 
  10.1s 7.2s 9.8s 8.2s 
Y 8s 10.3 7.9s 9.3s 
Time to detect 
neighbourship re-
establishment after 
cable replacement   . 
 49s 6.8s 43.5s 35.2s 
Y 50.5s 6.9s 43.4s 36.8s 
Peak CPU 
utilisation  
 70% 70% 70% 70% 
Y 70% 70% 70% 70% 
The first goal set in the methodology section previously 
was to investigate which protocol initialises the fastest from a 
cold start-up. 
As figure 3 demonstrates, the testing performed for this 
paper reveals a series of key findings through testing in 
Scenarios 1 and 2. These findings have been extracted from 
table I shown earlier in this section. 
As shown by figure 3 below, the startup times for EIGRPv6 
are significantly faster than that of OSPFv3, irrespective of the 
test scenario. However, a key finding is that compared to its 
Scenario 1 (P2P) result, EIGRPv6 took longer to start up in 
Scenario 2 (LAN) test environment. In addition, figure 3 also 
reveals that whereas EIGRPv6 performed worse in Scenario 2, 
OSPFv3 performed marginally better and better still when its 
IPSec encryption mechanism was enabled. Interestingly, 
EIGRPv6’s MD5 authentication mechanism affected the 
protocols performance in Scenario 1, but had no additional 
effect in Scenario 2. 
 
Fig. 3. OSPFv3 and EIGRPv6 Cold Start-up Time Comparison 
The second and third goals that were defined in the 
methodology of this paper are to assess OSPFv3 and 
EIGRPv6’s ability to recover from unforeseen failures and 
analyse which protocol re-converges with minimal packet 
drops. Therefore using the results collected in table I in 
addition to figures 4 and 5, this shows the averaged results 
from the convergence tests conducted in this paper. 
 
Fig. 4. OSPFv3 and EIGRPv6 Re-Convergence Times 
As revealed by figure 4, a number of key findings can be 
found. Firstly, figure 6 continues the trend observed in figure 4 
in that EIGRPv6 performance is better in Scenario 1 compared 
to that of Scenario 2. Although EIGRPv6 detected the neighbor 
was down faster in Scenario 2, it took longer to resend the 
traffic in Scenario 2 and also with a much bigger margin when 
MD5 authentication was activated. 
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Furthermore, figure 4 also shows that OSPFv3 performed 
better in Scenario 2 than Scenario 1 for neighbor detection, but 
was able to resend the traffic faster in Scenario 1. Moreover, 
when OSPFv3’s IPSec encryption was configured in Scenario 
2, the time taken to detect the neighbor was down increased. 
However as figure 5 shows, this result may have been 
caused by packet drops. 
Figure 5 reveals that compared to Scenario 1, OSPFv3 in 
Scenario 2 dropped on average more packets compared to 
Scenario 1. However, an interesting finding from this test is 
that whereas IPSec encryption improved the performance of 
OSPFv3, EIGRPv6’s MD5 authentication adversely affected 
the protocols performance in both test Scenarios. In addition, 
figure 5 also supports the trend identified throughout this 
paper, in that EIGRPv6 performs better in the point to point 
topology of Scenario 1 compared to that of Scenario 2’s LAN 
topology. 
 
Fig. 5. OSPFv3 and EIGRPv6 Packet Drop Comparison 
 
Fig. 6. Protocol Response Testing 
In addition, a test to measure the responsiveness times of 
OSPFv3 and EIGRPv6 was carried out by deliberately failing a 
link over an idle link. This test differs to the convergence tests 
discussed earlier as the purpose is to measure the time taken 
for each protocol to detect and re-establish a neighbourship, 
rather than detecting and re-sending traffic. This test satisfies 
the fourth goal in the methodology which is to analyse the 
response times of each protocol when detecting idle link 
changes. 
As shown in figure 6, a number of interesting findings can 
be found from the results extracted from table I. 
Firstly, the two ongoing trends identified throughout this 
paper are whereas IPSec improves the performance of 
OSPFv3, EIGRPv6’s MD5 negatively affects its performance 
and that EIGRPv6 performs better in the point to point 
environment of Scenario 1 compared to that of Scenario 2. 
Figure 6 also agrees with this trend with the exception of the 
point to point cable removal with authentication time average. 
Furthermore, a packet inspection using Wireshark was 
performed in addition to attempting to crack the type seven 
passwords implemented upon encrypting the running 
configurations within the Cisco 1841 routers. These tests meet 
the criteria for the fifth goal which is to examine each 
protocols security mechanism and implement them to compare 
their operational differences. 
As shown in figures 7 and 8, the results of the packet 
inspection can be observed when a packet is captured and 
analysed using Wireshark. 
 
Fig. 7. OSPFv3’s IPSec ESP Encrypted Packet 
As shown by figures 7 and 8, the major difference between 
the two packets is that compared to OSPFv3’s ESP IPSec 
encrypted packet, EIGRPv6’s MD5 authenticated packet 
makes no attempt to hide the information within the packet. 
Therefore as figure 8 shows, information such as the 
autonomous system number, the “K” values in use and the 
Hello times used by EIGRPv6 can be discovered by capturing 
one packet. 
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Fig. 8. EIGRPv6 MD5 Authenticated Packet 
In addition using the tools provided by [13], a test was also 
performed to attempt to reverse the type seven passwords 
stored in the routers running configuration. This type seven 
password is used by both protocols authenticate a neighboring 
router and is encrypted using the “service password-
encryption” command. The Cisco Type 7 Reversing tool found 
on [13] will be used to reverse the passwords stored in the 
routers running configuration file. 
Upon attempting to reverse the passwords used by both 
protocols, it was discovered that whereas OSPFv3’s passwords 
was only partially decrypted, EIGRPv6’s MD5 authentication 
passwords was completely decrypted and therefore revealed 
the authentication password required to peer with a router in 
the topology. The reason for this is because whereas OSPFv3’s 
ESP IPSec encryption requires a minimum password length of 
40 characters, EIGRPv6’s MD5 authentication mechanism 
specifies no minimum password length. Therefore, EIGRPv6 
can be configured with potentially very weak passwords and 
making the implemented password prone to decryption as a 
result. 
Lastly, the final goal set in the methodology was to observe 
any differences upon implementing both protocols. 
 
Fig. 9. OSPFv3 Router ID Prompt 
As revealed in figure 9, a key difference noticed when 
implementing OSPFv3 and EIGRPv6 is whereas OSPFv3 
generates a router ID prompt upon first configuration, 
EIGRPv6 does not generate this prompt for the creation of a 
router ID. As discussed previously, both protocols will not 
begin routing traffic until a router ID is created. As a result, a 
network administrator may spend time debugging EIGRPv6 
only to find that the protocol would not route traffic due to the 
lack of a router ID. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper finds that upon comparing the performance of 
OSPFv3 and EIGRPv6 using the tests that have been 
conducted throughout this project, EIGRPv6 was the faster 
performing protocol. However aside from the overall 
conclusion, a series of thought provoking results have been 
found in this project. These include: 
 That EIGRPv6 performed better in every test when it 
was configured for the point to point topology of 
Scenario 1. EIGRPv6’s performance was noticeably 
different when it was implemented into Scenario 2’s 
LAN environment, taking longer to recover from 
simulated failures and dropping considerably more 
packets. It can therefore be assumed from the findings 
that EIGRPv6 performs better within a point to point 
configuration, rather than a LAN environment. 
 OSPFv3’s performance was relatively similar when 
implemented into Scenarios 1 and 2, but on average 
performed consistently better when IPSec was enabled. 
By comparison, EIGRPv6’s performance was always 
degraded when its MD5 authentication mechanism was 
enabled. 
 However despite this degradation, EIGRPv6 still 
outperformed OSPFv3 in terms of sheer speed while 
converging and adjusting to failures and therefore wins 
the performance comparison. 
Therefore, the principle conclusion from the results of this 
paper is that when comparing OSPFv3 and EIGRPv6 within a 
small flat IPv6 enterprise network, EIGRPv6 outperforms 
OSPFv3 in terms of start-up and re-convergence speed and is 
therefore the faster protocol. This conclusion has been 
generated by testing OSPFv3 and EIGRPv6 in both a point to 
point and LAN based network environment, where OSPFv3 
took consistently longer to complete its operations than that of 
EIGRPv6. 
However whereas the MD5 authentication mechanism used 
by EIGRPv6 negatively affected its performance, IPSec 
noticeably improved OSPFv3’s performance. This therefore 
makes OSPFv3 an attractive option to network administrators 
who wish to implement a routing protocol that integrates a 
strong security mechanism and operates within a hierarchical 
network topology. By comparison, EIGRPv6 is designed to 
operate on a typically flat network structure which may still 
limit its application. 
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